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In 1789, mutinous seamen aboard the
H.M.S. Bounty cast Captain Bligh and
his crew of 17 adrift in an open boat.1
After sailing many days without food,
the desperate men managed to snare a
small bird. How could they share it?
Captain Bligh wanted the portions,
although meager, to be given out fair-
ly. He carefully cut the bird into 18
equal-sized pieces. Two crewmen then
engaged in the following protocol: the
first chose a portion randomly and
called out, “Who shall have this?” The
second, with his back to the proceed-
ings, called out a crewman’s name. 
Although fair, this negotiation pro-
tocol for distributing resources did
not lead to an envy-free distribution,
because some pieces, such as the feet
or beak, were clearly less desirable.
Can a protocol be both fair and envy-
free? Under certain circumstances,
yes. For example, the cake-cutting
protocol, which is at least 2,800 years
old, is both fair and envy-free for two
people.2 One person divides a cake in
two, and the other chooses the first
piece. This is fair in that each believes
he or she received at least half, and
envy-free in that neither would wish
to trade. This protocol succeeds even
when the participants disagree about
the portions’ value: while one might
simply want the largest possible piece,
the other might prefer a smaller piece
because it has more frosting. 
Letting Agents Cut the Cake
Since computational agents don’t eat
birds or cake, how will such protocols
matter to them and when will they
apply? We will show how protocols
can provide possibilities for benevo-
lence and prove useful in agent-based
auctions, the subjects of our two most
recent columns.3,4
First, agents can use the cake-cut-
ting protocol when negotiating for
resources. For example, two agents
sharing a processor might each require
CPU time and might also wish to
complete their computations as soon
as possible. One agent might select the
sizes of the processor’s time slices,
while the other would have first choice
of the resulting slices. Similar negotia-
tions could occur over bandwidth, rel-
ative cache sizes, locks on databases,
storage space in a file system, or task
decomposition and distribution. 
Advanced Cake Cutting
What if there are more than two
agents? Envy-free apportioning is more
difficult than fair apportioning because
an envy-free division is always fair,
while in a fair division someone may
still end up with the feet or beak. So
we will consider fair apportioning first.
One fair protocol for N agents
involves the agents’ successively reduc-
ing a slice until they deem it fair—
having a value of 1/N.5,6 The last agent
to reduce the slice must accept it. The
rest of the agents then repeat this pro-
cedure for the remainder of whatever
they are dividing. This trimming pro-
tocol is fair because each agent believes
its portion is at least 1/N of the total,
but it is not envy-free, because one
agent might believe another has
received a larger share. 
The moving-knife protocol, mediat-
ed by an auctioneer, is similar and pro-
ceeds as follows: the auctioneer slowly
increases the size of a time slice (or
other desired resource) until one agent
assesses the value at 1/N and yells,
“Stop!” That agent is awarded the slice.
The auctioneer repeats the protocol for
the rest of the N - 1 agents and the
remainder of the resource. The last
agent might end up with a larger or
smaller piece than everyone else, so
this protocol is not envy-free.
In another fair protocol, two of the
contending agents would first divide a
resource equally. A third agent would
then negotiate with each of them to
obtain one third of each one’s half. A
fourth agent would then negotiate
with the other three agents to obtain
one fourth of each one’s third. This
successive-pairs protocol continues
until all N agents have negotiated for
their portions. 
Divide-and-conquer, another fair
protocol, requires the division of a
resource to a point where it could be
easily divided among two or three
agents. According to this technique,
one of the agents divides the resource
first into halves, and the number of
contending agents is also divided into
halves. The agents in each half should
be happy to get a fair share of their
half of the resource. These halves and
the agents are again divided in half,
and so on until the remaining pieces
of the resource can be divided among
just two or three agents each.
An Envy-Free Protocol
A simple envy-free protocol for N
agents, which unfortunately works
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only in restricted domains, proceeds
as follows: assume that three agents
wish to reserve time during a fixed
interval. Each agent would like to
have as much time as possible and
also the earliest time possible. 
First, each agent is asked to divide
the interval into three pieces that it
thinks are fair and that it would be
willing to accept. If the agents all
value each piece equally, then they
would divide the interval in the same
way and the pieces could be assigned
to them arbitrarily. Each would be
happy with its piece.
If the agents value pieces different-
ly, then each would divide the interval
differently, as shown in Figure 1. In
this example, the green agent would
be assigned its leftmost piece (from
the start to G1), the blue agent would
be assigned its rightmost piece (from
B2 to the end), and the red agent
would be assigned its middle piece
(from R1 to R2). Each agent would
have one of the pieces it thought was
fair, and the other agents (in its esti-
mation) would have smaller pieces.
No agent would be envious.
Amazingly, part of the interval would
be left over (from G1 to R1 and from
R2 to B2). This protocol works for
any domain that can be linearized and
for any number of agents.
Requirements and
Properties
Good negotiation protocols should
offer more than just fair or envy-free
distributions. They should be well
defined and readily available so that
agents can easily implement and use
them. It seems reasonable to base
them on speech acts and incorporate
them into standard agent communi-
cation languages such as KQML and
FIPA’s ACL. Adopting a language
with precise semantics will make it
easier for agents to use the protocols
without misunderstandings. 
Negotiation protocols should also
be simple and efficient to implement,
stable (so that no agent has an incen-
tive to deviate from the protocol), dis-
tributed (so that no central decision-
maker is needed), and symmetric (not
inappropriately biased against any
agent).7 Furthermore, the protocols
should lead to optimal solutions. 
An efficient algorithm for cake cut-
ting, such as the auctioneer example,
requires just N - 1 cuts—the mini-
mum possible number of cuts
required to divide the resource among
N agents. The trimming protocol
would require N(N - 1)/2 cuts, and
the successive-pairs protocol would
use N! - 1 cuts. The divide-and-con-
quer protocol would require approxi-
mately Nlog2N cuts, the minimum
number needed for performing the
division without auctioning.
Negotiating about Tasks
Most agent-based negotiation proto-
cols were derived from results in game
theory and serve to allocate tasks.7 For
example, two agents might have to
visit a number of Web sites to search
for information. Rather than both vis-
iting the same sites, they could exhibit
benevolence by agreeing to exchange
some of their search tasks. What strat-
egy and protocol should they use to
minimize their tasks? 
With the monotonic concession
protocol, the agents successively com-
promise their positions by agreeing to
accept additional tasks. Negotiation
ends when neither agrees to compro-
mise further.
A Zeuthen strategy, in which each
agent must be aware of how the other
values each task, requires the agent
having an advantage to make a con-
cession. This process repeats until the
agents reach agreement. The result is
an optimum task allocation.
Agent-Based Web Auctions
The two most important require-
ments for online auctions are that
they be fair and secure.4 They should
also introduce low overhead in terms
of the cost they add to each transac-
tion and the complexity they intro-
duce into the process. Auctions can
be used not only for goods and ser-
vices, but also for information.
The Dutch auction is one of several
auction types developed to meet vari-
ous requirements. In a Dutch auction,
the price descends from a sufficiently
high number until one participant
elects to buy at the current price.
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Figure 1. Red, green, and blue agents divide the interval into what each sees
as three fair pieces.
Systems of the Bimonth
To create agents that will negotiate on your behalf,
visit the Bazaar at MIT’s Market Maker Testing
Site. Check it out!
To cut cakes (or allocate chores or determine fair rent obligations among
roommates) for any number of people, try the online Fair Division Calculator
at Harvey Mudd College.
The list below includes additional Web addresses for other activities relat-
ed to agent negotiation.
Bazaar • maker.media.mit.edu/
Fair Division Calculator • www.math.hmc.edu/~su/fairdivision/calc/
Kasbah • ecommerce.media.mit.edu/kasbah/screenshots/index.html
Agent-Mediated Integrative Negotiation for Electronic Commerce •
guttman.www.media.mit.edu/people/guttman/research/commerce/talk10/
sld001.htm
on the 
eb 
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The Dutch auction closely resem-
bles the moving-knife protocol for
resource allocation and could be
extended to N agents as follows. An
auctioneer begins with a certain price
for a portion of a resource and steadi-
ly reduces the asking price until one
agent accepts. The agent pays whatev-
er price has been agreed on and relin-
quishes its claim on the rest of the
resource. Then a similar auction fol-
lows for the remaining N - 1 agents
and resources. The process repeats
until all the resources have been allo-
cated. Such negotiation protocols
could serve to auction any resources
that can be fairly distributed in the
dimensions of time or space—for
example, allocations of storage, CPU
time, and search results. 
Bottom Line
So, how does your organization man-
age its resources? Does a company
vice president using the Web to do
market research for an upcoming
product rollout or an IPO get net-
work priority over a clerk’s search for
the best price on a Goo Goo Dolls
CD? For most organizations, the
answer is no. If your organization isn’t
using negotiating agents to manage its
critical resources, shouldn’t it be? n
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